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PLANNING FOR LEGALITY
Jeremy Waldron*
LEGALITY. By Scott Shapiro. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Pp. 472. $39.95.
I. COMPARISONS
What is law like? What can we compare it with in order to illuminate its
character and suggest answers to some of the perennial questions of jurisprudence?
Natural lawyers compare laws to moral propositions. A human law is an
attempt by someone who has responsibility for a human community to replicate, publicize, and enforce a proposition of objective morality such as
"Killing is wrong." Law is like moral reasoning, say the natural lawyers, and
laws should be regarded as principles of right reason (principles that reason
dictates as answers to the moral questions that need to be addressed in human society). However, in recent times legal philosophers have looked for
illumination in the domain of social fact rather than in the realm of value.
Law is like power, they have suggested, or like certain facts about the existence and exercise of power. So, for example, John Austin, writing in the
first half of the nineteenth century, said that laws were like commands. A
command is the expression of a wish coupled with the threat of a sanction,
and a law expresses the wish of a sovereign along with a threat (for the
event of noncompliance) that the sovereign's ascendancy in a society makes
credible.2 Justice Holmes offered a different comparison: a law, he said, is
like a prediction of what courts will do in a certain event.! The law prescribing fifty-five miles per hour as the speed limit for the state of New York is a
prediction that the courts will impose fines on those who are caught driving
faster than that. So jurisprudence is like social science: it takes a series of
predictions about what powerful people will do and it tests and organizes
them.
H.L.A. Hart, writing in the middle of the twentieth century, used a different comparison from social science. He argued that laws are like social
* University Professor and Professor of Law, New York University School of Law and
Chichele Professor of Social and Political Theory, Oxford University.
1.

See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, in AQUINAS: SELECTED POLITICAL

WRITINGS 103, 121 (A.P. D'Entraves ed., J.G. Dawson trans., 1959).
2.

See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 21, 166 (Wilfrid E.

Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832).
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law,
Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897),
reprintedin 79 B.U. L. REV. 699, 699 (1998).
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practices. In the United States there is a practice of removing one's cap at a
baseball game when the national anthem is played. There is no law to this
effect, but it is something one does; those who do it do so because everyone
does it and they think they ought to do it, too; and they frown upon and
sometimes remonstrate with those who fail to remove their caps when The
5
Star-SpangledBanner is played. Laws, says Hart, are like this-particularly
the most fundamental laws of a legal system.' The rule that courts follow
precedent, for example, is not commanded by a sovereign; and it is not a
prediction that judges who fail to follow precedent will be sanctioned. It is
just a practice among the higher judiciary that has become established and
entrenched. It is complicated, no doubt, and it is by no means an absolute
rule. But it exists as a law (in a given system of laws) because it is practiced
by the officials of the system.
Other positivists invoke more abstract and sophisticated comparisons.
Hans Kelsen said that laws are like norms. He did not mean moral norms; he
meant that laws were like simple normative statements such as "Do this!" or
"Do that!" or "This is to be done."' And this view is very common among
positivists today.' They compare laws with prescriptions that purport to
guide action. Someone might say "Don't drink" as a way of directing people
away from alcohol consumption: his saying that indicates a course of action
and prescribes its avoidance. For a while, during the period of Prohibition in
the 1920s, we had laws that were exactly like this prescription: they directed
us away from the use of alcohol. But then in 1933 we abandoned this norm
(at least for adults), though the law continued to direct minors not to consume alcohol.9 Laws are like that; they are norms or prescriptions that come
and go.
To say that law is like X does not preclude it from also being like Y.
Some jurists have backed more than one of these horses. William Blackstone tried to combine the command theory with the moral or natural law
theory. Law is both like a command and like a moral proposition: his definition of law was "a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in
a state commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong."'o Jeremy
Bentham derided this sort of eclecticism as unrigorous and potentially con-

4. H.L.A.
2d ed. 1994).

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW

254-59 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds.,

5.

See id. at 55-58.

6.

See id. at 109-10.

7.

HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAw

3-15, 70 (Max Knight trans., California Library

reprnted. 1989).

8. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 206-07 (2001);
The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 213-14 (1979).
9. I owe the example to Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, in
153 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001).
10.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs

JOSEPH RAZ,

HART'S POSTSCRIPT

*44 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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tradictory." But sometimes more than one comparison is appropriate either
because law has many different aspects or because there are different kinds
and levels of laws. H.L.A. Hart famously distinguished between the primary
rules and the secondary rules of a legal system.12 As I have indicated, his
comparison of law with social practices works best for some of the most
fundamental secondary rules, like the rule of recognition. In a system of
customary law it might also work for primary rules; these too might be best
understood as social practices. But in a system of enacted law, it is better to
understand primary rules as norms or prescriptions directed by lawmakers to
persons who are expected to comply with them. Their existence conditions
may include facts about compliance; but the comparison between ordinary
primary rules and social practices is for the most part unilluminating for
modem legal systems." So we describe primary rules as norms rather than
as practices. But sometimes we use both analogies to illuminate a given law.
So, for example, in Hart's account, we say that secondary rules are illuminated by the comparison with social practices but that they are also
illuminated by the comparison with norms. This is because the practices
Hart has in mind are not just convergences of behavior, but convergences of
behavior that has an internal aspect oriented to the guidance of the conduct
of those who participate in the practice. Hart's secondary rules are like
norms and they are like social practices.
II. THE

PLANNING THEORY

Scott Shapiro, who teaches jurisprudence and philosophy at Yale University, has written a book-rich and vibrant with jurisprudential
ambition-suggesting a new comparison. Laws are like plans, he says. "Legal activity is an activity of social planning" (p. 195), and the laws that
result from social planning are themselves just like plans that have been
adopted in our community. Like the plans that a bunch of people may make
among themselves to coordinate an activity like cooking dinner together or
going on a trip, social plans operate to guide and coordinate the activities of
a number of people acting together but also in partial independence of one
another to secure a common objective. "The main idea behind the Planning
Theory of Law," says Shapiro, "is that the exercise of legal authority . . . is
an activity of social planning. Legal institutions plan for the communities
over whom they claim authority, both by telling their members what they
may or may not do and by authorizing some of these members to plan for
others" (p. 195).
In elaborating his Planning Theory, Shapiro does not reject the conventional view of law as norms (that is, laws as prescriptions that purport to
11. See JEREMY
Everett ed., 1928).

BENTHAM,

A

COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES

60-73 (Charles Warren

12. The distinction is between primary rules, governing conduct, and secondary rules, which
regulate the way in which laws are made, recognized, interpreted, and applied.
13.

See HART, supra note 4, at 110-17.

886

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:883

guide action). But his position is that the normative view is incomplete:
"[L]egal activity is more than simply the activity of formulating, adopting,
repudiating, affecting, and applying norms for members of the community"
(p. 195). To plan is to adopt, subscribe to, and comply with a set of norms
that makes sense in light of a common purpose, hopefully a set of norms
that meshes purposefully with the norms adopted by others involved in that
project. Sally is to make sure the car is filled with gas; she is guided by the
norm that says, "Sally, make sure the car is filled with gas." And Harry is to
bring his luggage at a certain time to a street corner near the University of
Chicago; he is guided by a norm that says, "Harry, bring your luggage to the
corner at 10 a.m." The two norms intermesh, and being guided in these
complementary ways, Harry and Sally can carry through on their plan to
drive together from Chicago to New York City.14 But while all plans involve
norms, "not all norms are plans" (p. 128). The norms of logic, for example,
are not plans, according to Shapiro (p. 128); they are just norms. And the
same, Shapiro says, is true of moral principles (p. 128) like "Thou shalt not
kill." All they do is direct us away from killing. But laws-which Shapiro
thinks are mostly not illuminated by any comparison with moral principles-are plans. The Sherman Act, for example, is a plan for running a
market economy free of collusive and uncompetitive distortions; it requires
all sorts of individuals, firms, and officials to follow various norms that are
supposed to mesh together as subplans in one vast, complex, planned enterprise designed to avoid monopolies, restraints on trade, and unfair methods
of competition (pp. 195-97).
In pursuing this theme, Shapiro is drawing on the work of Michael
Bratman, a philosopher at Stanford University, who analyzes the structure of
planning and the intentionality of joint action.'- When one person plans out
an activity for himself, he breaks a complex enterprise down into its component parts, so that he can see how they fit together, what order they need to
be pursued in, and what each component requires so far as the other components are concerned. To cook dinner, I must buy food, and so my trip to the
supermarket must be oriented to the ingredients of the recipe I have in mind,
and the timing of my preheating the oven must be determined by how hot
the oven needs to be for the dish I want to cook and how long it will take me
to get to the supermarket and back, which depends on which supermarket I
choose to go to, which depends in turn on what I need to buy. That is oneperson planning.
When two people engage in an action like cooking dinner together, the
intentionality is more complicated. We cannot say that each of them intends
to cook dinner, because the intentional actions of each may relate only to a
14.

See the opening scene of WHEN HARRY MET SALLY ...

(Castle Rock Entertainment et

al. 1989).
See, e.g., MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS AND PRACTICAL REASON (1987);
15.
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared CooperativeActivity, in FACES OF INTENTION 93 (1999); Michael E.
Bratman, Shared Intention in FACES OF INTENTION, supra, at 109.

16.

I have adapted this example from pp. 121-22.
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part of the dinner-cooking enterprise. I intend to marinate and grill the meat,
while you intend to prepare the vegetables. But neither is it simply a case of
my having the meat-intention and your having the vegetable-intention (as
though we were operating independently of one another). What is important
is that we both orient our particular intentions (meat or vegetables) to the
overall plan that we share (dinner), to which we have a common intentional
attitude; and we organize our particular assignments-our subplans, if you
like-to mesh together in a way that means that dinner ends up being
cooked by the two of us. The behavior of each person is guided by the part
of the subplan that applies to him, but at the same time each person monitors
how his part of the plan and the other person's part of the plan are going and
adjusts his behavior accordingly so that mishaps and unforeseen complications are taken properly into account as things proceed.
As I have said, Shapiro thinks that all this casts a great deal of light on
law and the problems of jurisprudence. "[L]egal activity also seeks to accomplish the same basic goals that ordinary, garden-variety planning does,
namely, to guide, organize, and monitor the behavior of individuals and
groups" (p. 200). Of course, the groups involved in the making and carrying
forward of legal plans are very large; Shapiro talks of "massively shared
agency" (p. 143). And it may be much harder to create and sustain a sense of
common purpose among millions of opinionated individuals in any given
field of endeavor. Part of what is involved in social planning is identifying
potential conflicts as well as complexities and difficulties, and setting up
ways of dealing with these before things go dangerously awry (p. 133). To
accommodate these vicissitudes, planning for activity among millions may
require hierarchies among those whose activities are to be coordinated, so
that not everyone is involved directly in the specification of the overall purpose and not everyone is involved in dividing the tasks up and assigning
them throughout the group. Shapiro's discussion of this "dense horizontal
and vertical division of labor" (p. 149), and his account of how people can
be involved in plans from which they are in a sense alienated, is one of the
best parts of the book:
Because alienated participants are not usually committed to the success of
the joint activity, it is likely that they will have to be given detailed guidance on how to act. It may also be necessary to create hierarchical
structures so that conflicts are resolved and performance monitored. Finally, those in supervisory positions might need to be authorized to enforce
the group's policies through the imposition of sanctions. Plans, we can see,
are powerful tools for managing the distrust generated by alienation. For
the task of institutional design in such circumstances is to create a practice
that is so thick with plans and adopters,affecters, appliers, and enforcers
of plans that alienatedparticipantsend up acting in the same way as non-

alienated ones. The fact that activities can often be structured so that
participants intentionally achieve goals that are not their goals accounts for
the pervasiveness of massively shared agency in the world around us. (p.

150)
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Most importantly, besides this high degree of complex organization, legal planning involves planning to plan. It involves setting up all-purpose
planning arrangements (which are themselves plans) that regulate the
process of social planning. The legislature, as an institution, embodies a
plan-not about anything in particular, but about planning in general. Having such an institution is tremendously valuable as we face the need to
develop plans of all different kinds in different sets of social circumstances.
A new form of terrorism emerges on 9/11 and we urgently need a plan for
responding to it; that plan needs to be developed and followed through
among millions of people who have different preferences and priorities as to
how we should approach the problem. Navigating this contentious issue will
be bad enough, but things will be even worse if we have to start from scratch
in the planning process, determining amid the havoc that the terrorists have
created what procedures are to be used in trying to come up with a response.
Fortunately, we already have an institution and a set of procedures designed
not necessarily with terrorism in mind, but with planning in mind. We have
the U.S. Congress and we can use the procedures it embodies to formulate
and enact the USA PATRIOT Act," even though those procedures have
never been used for planning of exactly this kind before. They have been
used for antitrust planning and social security and the promotion of civil
rights, and they are open and adaptable enough to be used to accommodate
the making of this new kind of plan that we urgently need.
And something like this is true of the other institutions of the legal system as well. Courts are all-purpose mechanisms for protecting the integrity
of and settling disputes about the plans we already have and for making authoritative determinations about what is required of whom under their
auspices. They are useful, too, for elaborating and extending existing plans
to new circumstances, as well as for developing new plans in an incremental
sort of way. As Shapiro put it in an earlier piece, legal institutions are or
embody large-scale plans oriented to the very abstract task of the creation
and maintenance of a unified system of rules.' 8
III.

ARE ALL LAWs PLANS?

The exact structure of Shapiro's thesis is not always clear. He wants to
say that "legal activity is best understood as social planning" (p. 120), and
he means, at least in the first instance, activity like legislation and the development of lines of doctrine. Shapiro pursues an interesting distinction
between top-down planning (where a bunch of people begin with an overall
goal or the specification of complex action that they want to achieve, and
deliberately and methodically carve it up into its component parts, assigning
each part to some person or agency), which is what legislation is like, and
bottom-up planning (where the overall plan is constructed on the wing as it
17. USA PATRICT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.)
18. Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans, and Practical Reason, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387, 421 (2002).
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were, by people who begin with some of the subplans and as they go along
develop a sense of how they might mesh together in a larger project), which
is what the emergence of common law doctrine is like.
But Shapiro also wants to say that the laws that issue from these planning processes have something in common with plans. Sometimes he says
they are "planlike norms" (p. 120); he uses this term in particular to refer to
customary norms which, he says, have evidently not been produced as plans
though "they are highly planlike in nature" (p. 225). Other times he says that
his intention is not to draw an analogy between laws and plans, but to insist
that laws literally are plans.9 There is no contradiction here. If all laws are
plans then this will include the laws that structure our legislatures and
courts. But it is sometimes harder to see how our understanding of particular
laws-the upshots of legislative activity for example-is advanced by describing them as plans (or as planlike).
Consider, for example, a simple rule of criminal law: the prohibition on
homicide. In what sense can we describe this as a plan? It certainly seems to
be a norm, and that is the way it is usually understood in jurisprudence. It
purports to guide our actions away from murder and manslaughter (assuming, of course, that we need guidance of this sort to supplement the guidance
that morality already affords). So we have the law against killing. What
element of planning, as opposed to simple normativity, does this straightforward prohibition embody? It can't just be that we imagine our legislators
saying: "Here's the plan: there is to be no killing." The notion of a plan here
would be so vapid as to add little or nothing to the notion of a norm.
Three further possibilities suggest themselves. The first two pursue the
point that what I am calling a straightforward prohibition is in reality not all
that simple. First of all, the law regarding homicide is not normally expressed in the simple form of "Thou shalt not kill." Usually its formulation
is something like "Murder is defined as X and the penalty for murder shall
be Y." The formulation is still normative: it directs the authorities to impose
some particular sanction, Y,on those who satisfy the definition, X, of murder. And it does seem more plausible and perhaps quite illuminating to
characterize that by saying, "Here's the plan: we will imprison the murderers for life." Our society has plans for dealing with earthquakes and plans
for dealing with inflation, and this is our plan for dealing with murder. On
this account, Shapiro's Planning Theory would take sides as between Hans
Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart on how best to understand the essence of a law that
specifies an offense or delict: according to Kelsen, the essence of such a law
is the guidance it offers to officials about what to do in the case of certain
behavior by a citizen (though the citizen is free, if he likes, to infer a prohibition governing his conduct from overhearing this instruction directed at
officials), whereas according to Hart, the essence of such a law remains the
primary guidance it is supposed to offer the ordinary citizens. 20 I don't think
19.

Seep. 119.

20. Compare HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY
burg trans., 1945), with HART, supra note 4, at 38-39.

OF LAW AND STATE

60-61 (Anders Wed-
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Shapiro pursues this line or regards the Planning Theory as taking sides between Kelsen and Hart.
A second possibility-overlapping with the first-is that we pay attention to the complexity of real-world homicide laws, even in the norms they
address to the citizen. The law of homicide says much more to the citizen
than "Thou shalt not kill." Quite apart from its immediate normative guidance and from the procedural and penal directives issued to officers of the
state, the law of homicide lays down definitions, it couples mental elements
with physical elements of the offense, it distinguishes degrees of homicide,
it sets out defenses and excuses, it prescribes statutes of limitations, and it
accumulates and organizes doctrine; it does all sorts of things-some of
them technical, some of them not-to give this norm legal clothing that allows it to be administered as part of the complex apparatus of an effective
and fair legal system. It provides general and detailed characterizations of
the offending that it is concerned with. As John Finnis puts it, "[I]t is the
business of the [legal] draftsman to specify, precisely, into which of these
costumes and relationships an act of killing-under-such-and-suchcircumstances fits." 2 ' And Finnis adds, "That is why 'No one may kill . . .' is
legally so defective a formulation."22 Once one acknowledges this complexity in a given prohibition, once we see that what we are calling a primary
rule is really a much more complicated entity than just a simple norm, then
it is perhaps easier to assimilate it to a plan. But there would have to be a
little bit more said in order to make the analogy work and to make it helpful.
For not every form of normative complexity discloses planning. A set of
norms can be complex, but still remain stubbornly unilluminated by being
described as a plan. I wish Shapiro had said more about this to justify his
characterization.
We might elaborate on this by noting that there is widespread
disagreement in society on each and every element that goes into a complex
law of homicide. We disagree about self-defense and the duty to retreat; we
disagree about the "battered spouse" defense; we disagree about the felonymurder rule; we disagree about the insanity defense; we disagree about the
applications of doctrines like necessity in homicide cases; and we disagree
about all sorts of procedural and penal elements. But on each and every one
of these points, there is a social interest in our having and sharing a single
framework of positions that adds up to a law of homicide that can stand in
the name of us all, notwithstanding our disagreement. This sort of coordination in the face of disagreement is one of the functions that Shapiro
attributes to plans-I shall say more about it in Part IV-and so, in this
sense, one can identify a planning element in the primary rules about homicide." They plan out a way for us through the tendentious tangle of
controversies associated with homicide.

also

21.

JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs

22.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

23.

Finnis also adopts a coordination approach to the functions of law. See id. at 231-33; see
105 (1999).

JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT

283 (1980).
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A third possibility is more prominent in Shapiro's account. A primary
rule, which looks more like a norm than a plan, may nevertheless count as
part of a plan when considered in its relation to a whole array of other
norms. Shapiro's best example of this is traffic law:
Rules that require drivers to be a certain age, pass a test, inspect their cars
every year, wear seat belts, buy liability insurance, stop at red lights, ride
on the right side, and drive not over 55 mph or under the influence of alcohol are all part of a comprehensive regulatory regime. Their aim is to guide
and organize the behavior of many different individuals so as to achieve a
very complex and contentious goal, which is safe, fast, and fair driving, in
an arbitrary environment. They do so by serving as paternalistic measures
that compensate for cognitive incapacities, weakness of the will, and ignorance; coordination devices that render behavior more predictable; and
ethically acceptable guidelines that ensure that motorists will not interfere
with one another while simultaneously obviating the need to deliberate,
negotiate, and bargain about what behavior is reasonable under the circumstances (p. 200).
Maybe we can regard even the laws defining criminal offenses in this holistic light. They hang together as an overall plan for managing our
interactions and conflicts. As a society, we say, "Here's the plan: we are going to deal with conflict and anger without killing, fighting, etc." I find all
three of these accounts attractive-if one leaves aside the Hart/Kelsen quarrel under the first heading about what the true essence of a prohibition is.
And all three help us see why Shapiro's Planning Theory can cast some significant light on law.
IV. PLANS AND POSITIVISM

That we can find these elements of planning in law, not only at the level
of secondary rules but also at the level of primary rules, means we have
opened up an interesting analogy. Laws are like plans in these and no doubt
in other respects. But what progress does this sponsor in jurisprudence?
What conundrums in legal philosophy does this help us untangle? What positions in the traditional antitheses of jurisprudential controversy does the
Planning Theory support?
Shapiro is a legal positivist and he thinks the Planning Theory supports
positivism. After all, the existence or nonexistence of plans, in the sense that
interests him, is a matter of social fact:
Whether I have a plan to go to the store today, or we have a plan to cook
dinner together tonight, depends not on the desirability of these plans but
simply on whether we have in fact adopted (and not yet rejected) them. In
other words, positivism is trivially and uncontroversially true in the case of
plans: the existence of a plan is one thing, its merits or demerits quite another. (p. 119)
Unfortunately, "plan positivism," as he calls it (p. 178), does not settle the
issue between natural lawyers and legal positivists. It would if being a plan
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or being planlike were all there was to being a law. But as we have seen, law
or laws may also be other things (or like other things) besides. We noted that
William Blackstone analogized laws both to rules laid down by civil authority and also to propositions of right and wrong: a law is "a rule of civil
conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is
right and prohibiting what is wrong."24 Nothing can be a law for Blackstone
if it is not a rule prescribed by the sovereign in a state, but that is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. And the fact that the necessary condition is
understood positivistically doesn't show that the other conditions for the
existence of law have to be understood in that way. Laws are a subspecies of
commanded rules, according to Blackstone, and the mark of the subspecies
is a moral criterion. Even Aquinas's natural law theory had this shape.2 5
There cannot be human law unless certain social facts obtain; but that certain social facts should be characterized as the existence of law depends on
other things besides social facts, such as the rules (whose existence is a matter of fact) partaking of right reason. The same might be true in the case of
the Planning Theory. Whether there is (whether we have) a plan or not is a
matter of social fact; and if laws are plans (or like plans, in this regard), their
existence is at least in part a matter of social fact. But it doesn't follow at all
that the social facts associated with plans exhaust the existence conditions of
law.
I think Shapiro is aware of this point, because he has a couple of additional claims to make that he thinks dispose of the natural lawyers' thesis
that laws may be (by definition) plans-that-have-a-certain-moral-quality.
The first claim is that the social functions performed by the sort of plans that
laws and lawmaking involve preclude there being a moral test for laws' existence. Shapiro puts it this way:
Shared plans must be determined exclusively by social facts if they are to
fulfill theirfunction.... [S]hared plans are supposed to guide and coordinate behavior by resolving doubts and disagreements about how to act. If a
plan with a particular content exists only when certain moral facts obtain,
then it could not resolve doubts and disagreements about the right way of
proceeding. For in order to apply it, the participants would have to engage
in deliberation or bargaining that would recreate the problem that the plan
aimed to solve. The logic of planning requires that plans be ascertainable
by a method that does not resurrect the very questions that plans are designed to settle. Only social facts, not moral ones, can serve this function.
(p. 177)
Shapiro is right that the function of positive law is often to settle an issue
defined in moral terms, a contentious issue about which people disagree.
Indeed he says in several places that this is the definitive aim of law:
"[Legal systems are enterprises for solving moral problems" (p. 358).

24.

BLACKSrONE, supra note 10, at *44.

25.

See AQUINAS, supra note 1.
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Every community, modestly sized or larger, faces what he calls the circumstances of legality:
The circumstances of legality obtain whenever a community has numerous
and serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, contentious or
arbitrary. In such instances, the benefits of planning will be great, but so
will the costs and risks associated with nonlegal forms of ordering behavior, such as improvisation . . . communal consensus, or personalized

hierarchies. Indeed, the costs and risks of nonlegal planning may be so
large as to be prohibitive.
The "fundamental aim" of law, says Shapiro, is to remedy the moral deficiencies of the circumstances of legality. "[L]egal systems are agile, durable,
and capable of reducing planning costs to such a degree that social problems
can be solved in an efficient manner" (p. 172).
The aim, then, in every area in which we face the circumstances of legality, is to provide a plan that can get us past disagreement to a point where
we are able to orient our action to a common project or a common framework in spite of our moral differences. For example, we disagree about the
proper extent of health care provision for the poor: some think that all the
health needs of the poor should be taken care of by the state in a sort of British-style National Health Service ("NHS"); others think that the poor like
everyone else should buy health services in the marketplace (apart from dire
emergencies) and that they should be empowered to do so by schemes that
set them to work for a living wage. The partisans of these proposed plans
are bitter rivals, each regarding the other's scheme as unjust. But unless we
settle on one plan or other, perhaps nothing will be done for the poor. So we
have to settle on one of them as the plan to be adopted for our society, using
the all-purpose planning mechanisms that Shapiro identifies with secondary
legal rules. We cannot do this unless the plan that is adopted is identifiable
in nonmoral terms. If something's being the indigent health-care plan for
our society depends (even among other things) on its moral quality, then the
partisans of the rival plans will identify different and incompatible schemes
as the indigent health-care plan for our society. And as a result, planning in
this area will not coordinate their activities as it is supposed to.
This is a fine argument as far as it goes. Its implication is that insistence
on a moral criterion for something's counting as "law" will often interfere
with and undermine whatever planning functions law is supposed to be performing in the circumstances of moral disagreement. As a disputable
honorific, the application of the term "law" will raise some of the very
issues-the moral issues-that the thing whose status we are arguing about
is supposed to settle. If nothing is law unless it is just, then people who disagree about justice won't ever be able to agree on what the law is (even
though one of the prime functions of law is to establish plans in the face of
disagreement). It is an example of what I have called elsewhere "normative
26. P. 170. By "arbitrary,' Shapiro is referring to moral problems that have the character that
any arbitrarily chosen solution from a given range of solutions is better than none, provided all
people follow it. The rule of the road is a good example.
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positivism."27 One begins from a normative account of law's mission. (Positivists who deny that we can give such an account of law's mission are
"mistaken," says Shapiro (p. 391).) And then one argues that that mission
cannot be performed unless rules, commands, norms, edicts, or plans are
recognized as law by nonmoral criteria. In other words, one begins from
something very like a natural law criterion for law but then one argues that
that criterion requires that laws be identifiable as such in a positivistic way.28
However, it is unclear how far this can be taken as an argument against
using a natural-law criterion to distinguish plans that count as law from
plans that do not. There are many moral predicates that might be implicated
in a natural-law definition of law and there are many moral predicates that
might be implicated in the dispute that lawmaking in a particular area tries
to settle. If different sets of moral predicates are at work in these two contexts, then the problem that Shapiro identifies may not arise. Suppose we
say that it is part of the definition of "law" that a law must be, on its face,
evenhanded and that nothing can count as law if it is grossly partial to one
segment of the community against others; and suppose we then set out to
make law (to make a plan that will have the status of law among us) in order
to settle the question of indigent health care among the partisans of rival
proposals-for example, the NHS-style proposal and the workfare proposal
mentioned a moment ago. The partisans of the proposals disagree about the
merits of the two plans; each thinks the other's plan is undesirable and perhaps unfair. But that moral disagreement need not be equated with possible
disagreements about the application of the moral criteria supposedly associated with the word "law" itself. It is possible that each partisan may agree
that the other's plan is not grossly partial to one segment of the community;
so each may agree that the other's plan, if adopted, could count as law according to the natural law definition. "Law" would still be a moralized term,
applying to some possible plans but not others; but it wouldn't necessarily
resurrect the very moral disputes that a plan was intended to settle in the
first place.
We could even use Shapiro's own conception of law's fundamental mission to make this point. Suppose we say, in a natural-law spirit, that nothing
counts as law unless it purports to make a moral contribution to society by
addressing the circumstances of legality in some area. No doubt we will
quarrel about which laws satisfy this criterion: some manifestly self-serving
decisions by greedy legislators will constitute clear cases of nonlegal plans;
other examples will be controversial. But those controversies need not be
identical with the controversies that a given plan purports to solve in the
event that it is addressing the circumstances of legality in some area. They
may be identical in some cases, but they need not be. So Shapiro's first ar-

27. See Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT, supra
note 9, at 411.
28. See also GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 328 (Tony
Honor6 & Joseph Raz eds., 1986).
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gument against having a moralized definition of "law" does not necessarily
go through.
I think, by the way, that something similar can be said about Shapiro's
argument for exclusive legal positivism in Chapter Nine of Legality (pp.
271-77). To put it very crudely, exclusive legal positivists hold not only that
there cannot be moral criteria for the identification of law, but also that there
cannot be moral criteria for its application either. Some traffic laws seem to
be incompatible with this. Ohio used to have this provision in section 12603
of its traffic code:
Whoever operates a motor vehicle or motorcycle on the public roads or
highways at a speed greater than is reasonable or proper, having regard for
width, traffic, use and the general and usual rules of such road or highway,
or so as to endanger the property, life or limb of any person, shall be fined
not more than twenty-five dollars.29
To apply this to a given case, one would have to figure out for oneself what
speed is reasonable and proper for the road one was driving on. But people
disagree about that and it is surely the task of traffic law to settle such disagreements by providing (e.g.) numerical speed limits. The application of
section 12603 seems to raise the very issues that we would hope a plan in
this area would settle. So we might want to say that section 12603 is not
really a genuine plan and hence not really a genuine law; it is an inchoate
plan; and it will only become a proper plan, and hence a proper law, once
courts have filled in some determinate values for "reasonable" and "proper."
After all, as Shapiro puts it, "The existence and content of a plan cannot be
determined by facts whose existence the plan aims to settle" (p. 275). But
once again the argument moves too quickly. The aim of section 12603 may
not be to direct the speed at which we drive-it may be thought that conditions vary too much to enable a determinate number to be set3-but to
direct our exercise of moral judgment. Some people think it is appropriate to
29. This is my example, not Shapiro's. The provision is cited in State v. Schaeffer, 117 N.E.
220, 222 (Ohio 1917). See Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness and the Guidance of Action, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAw (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., forthcoming
2011).
30.

As the court said in Schaeffer

The Legislature ... in this instance, saw fit to fix no definite rate of speed for the car ....
Some statutes have undertaken to fix a rate of speed which would be prima facie dangerous,
but a rate of speed dangerous in one situation would be quite safe in another situation, and if
the rate of speed were definitely fixed, naturally it would have to be the minimum speed at
which cars might be safely driven, because that speed would have to be a safeguard against
every possible situation which would be perilous even at a speed of six or eight miles an hour.
There is no place in all the public [roads] where a situation is not constantly changing from
comparatively no traffic to a most congested traffic; from no foot travelers to a throng of them;
from open and clear intersections, private drives, and street crossings, to those that are
crowded; from free and unobstructed streets to streets filled with crowds of foot travelers and
others getting off and on street cars and other vehicles. In order to meet these varying situations, and impose upon the automobilist [sic] the duty of anticipating them and guarding
against the dangers that arise out of them, this statute was evidently passed in the interests of
the public safety in a public highway.

117 N.E. at 225-26.
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jump into an automobile and drive off without even considering what a reasonable speed would be; others think it is important to figure this out before
one puts the car in gear. Section 12603 settles that dispute: in effect, it directs the use of moral judgment in circumstances where it might not
otherwise be engaged. If it is a plan, it is a plan for moral thinking-because
that, as much as behavior of various kinds, is one of the things we need to
plan for. Left to themselves some people will reflect on what a reasonable
speed is given the condition and width of the road, and others will not. This
is too risky; so the plan is that everyone must drive at a reasonable speed
taking into account width, condition, etc.; and to comply with or play their
part in this plan, drivers are going to have to address themselves to this issue
of reasonableness.
The example shows that even when moral predicates are used, their use
does not always beg the moral question that the law is supposed to settle.
And so we are back with the general response to Shapiro's first argument: a
moral criterion for identifying law or for identifying what a given law requires does not necessarily defeat the purpose of having a law in the first
place.
V. THE

RULE OF LAW

Shapiro's second response to the possibility that there might be moral
criteria to distinguish plans that are laws from plans that are not is a more
disarming response than the one we have just considered. But I think it is
also misguided. Let me explain.
Some jurists have argued that commands or rules or plans count as laws
only if, in their form and in the procedures associated with them, they respect the dignity and freedom of those to whom they apply. Lon Fuller, for
example, identifies a number of formal characteristics that laws must have
in order to respect the dignity of free persons. They must be prospective,
stable, public, clear, practicable, and consistent with the other laws that also
apply to the same people." Fuller's position is that every departure from
these principles in the form that is taken by the rules or plans that are used
in governance "is an affront to man's dignity as a responsible agent. To
judge his actions by unpublished or retrospective laws, or to order him to do
an act that is impossible, is to convey to him your indifference to his powers
of self-determination."" And a gross departure from them "does not simply
result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not properly
called a legal system at all."" (Others have taken a similar line so far as the
procedural aspects of law are concerned.34) So once again, even if one ac31.

LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 41 (rev. ed. 1964).

32.

Id. at 162.

33.

Id. at 39.

34. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REv. 1, 5-10, 55-60
(2008); Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure 13-14 (N.Y Univ. Sch.
of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-73, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1688491.
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cepts Shapiro's assimilation of laws to plans, one might still (as Fuller does)
reserve the term "law" for plans that in their formal or procedural aspects
are not gross affronts to human dignity. No doubt people sometimes disagree about which laws are gross affronts to this kind to human dignity, but
that disagreement is not of the kind that laws are designed to settle. We may
disagree about the fairness of the rival schemes for indigent health care
without disagreeing about whether in their formal and procedural aspects
those schemes count as gross dignitarian affronts.
The title of Shapiro's book is "Legality," and that is a term that is often
used in association with the position I have just outlined. Fuller sometimes
referred to his eight principles about prospectivity, stability, publicity, and so
forth (and their dignitarian implications), as "principles of legality."" Hart
also used that term for them, though he certainly did not follow Fuller all the
way in the argument I have been outlining. Often, too, we use "legality" to
distinguish modes of governance that count as the rule of law from managerial governance or other forms of overtly manipulative, coercive, arbitrary,
or disrespectful rule. Indeed there is a certain irony in Shapiro's association
of "legality" with planning because many people regard social planning as
more or less the opposite of legality. In the work of F.A. Hayek, for example, these are polar opposites: a Soviet-style commitment to social planning
is the very antithesis of the rule of law. 7
Shapiro addresses this issue, pointing out quite rightly that there is no
reason why the "notorious large-scale public projects" of people like Stalin
and Mao "should be taken to represent and thus discredit the practice of
social planning in general" (p. 154). Social plans need not represent vast,
all-consuming, centralized initiatives that direct and control the totality of
economic activity in a society. A free market economy is planned in the
sense that a framework is laid out through the laws of contracts, property,
finance, securities, corporations, etc., to coordinate the activities of vast
numbers of people. But that sort of planning is in principle compatible with
the rule of law-indeed Hayek would say it actually requires the rule of law.
His position is that "in the usual sense of purpose, namely the anticipation
of a particular, foreseeable event, the law indeed does not serve any purpose
but countless different purposes of different individuals."3 8 So in that sense,
the law is not a giant plan, but a giant facility for individual plans. But as
Shapiro notes, planning can include "[p]lanning for [s]pontaneous [olrder"
(p. 160). And here, I think, he can agree with Hayek that law is a "multipurpose instrument[],"39 a plan for freedom, a plan for the coordination and
35.

FULLER,

supra note 31, at 41.

36. See H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 12 (1963); H.L.A. Hart, Problems of
Philosophy of Law, in 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 264, 273-74 (Paul Edwards ed.,
1967); see also Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart's Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83
N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1135, 1144-47 (2008).
37.

See FRIEDRICH A.

38.

1 F.A.

39.

Id. at 113.

HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM

55 (1944).

HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER

112-13 (1983).
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regulation of all the millions of plans that individuals have in a way that
reduces conflict and embodies freedom. I don't mean that Shapiro is a
Hayekian in his own political view of law's substantive ends. He is open on
that; I don't think he accepts Hayek's view that some substantive ends are
incompatible with the rule of law. But he is happy to accept the Hayekian
position that the repudiation of Soviet-style planning does not mean that a
free society and a free economy can come into existence spontaneously
without the sort of organized structure that legal frameworks and legal planning requires. He cites Hayek for the proposition that even if "'the holder of
coercive power . . . confine[s] himself in general to creating conditions un-

der which the knowledge and initiative of individuals is given the best scope
so that they can plan most successfully,' " still the holder of coercive power
(the state) has to plan even to do that much."
Not only does Shapiro make the case that his affection for planning is
consistent with a Hayekian affection for legality, he also accepts a large part
of the argument I attributed at the beginning of this Part to Fuller-the argument that makes the principles of legality part of the criteria for
identifying a social plan as law. As I said, his response is a disarming one.
Fuller's principles, he says, "state necessary conditions for the existence of
social planning" (p. 395), and "regimes that flout these principles are simply
not engaged in the basic activity of law" (p. 394). After all, how can you
have a plan that is not prospective or contradictory or unclear or changing so
quickly that no one can adjust their behavior to it? How can a plan be social
if it is secret or if it is not general in its formulations?
Shapiro's position therefore is that we can get to Fuller's principles just
by reflecting positivistically on the sort of thing law is. "The positivist ...
can agree with Fuller that observance of his eight principles is necessary for
the existence of a legal system and yet deny that the existence of law depends on moral facts" (p. 395). According to Shapiro, we don't come to
Fuller's principles by reflecting on what mode of governance is necessary to
respect human dignity-rejecting as nonlaw modes of governance that do
not have that moral orientation. We come to it by reflecting on governance
itself, and in particular its planning aspect. Shapiro does not deny that governance that satisfies these principles is, for that reason, valuable. But the
value is simply the value of having social plans at all. We face numerous and
serious complex moral problems, and we need plans to deal with them-that
is, to guide, coordinate, and monitor our actions: "If a regime did not normally produce standards that were general, promulgated, clear, prospective,
consistent, satisfiable, and stable ... it would not provide the guidance, co-

ordination, and monitoring we need to solve the problems we ought to
solve" (p. 396).
But suppose Shapiro is wrong in the assumption he makes that effective
planning for a society is necessarily general, prospective, stable, etc. We
know that managerial planning of large firms is not like that. The plans are
usually not general; they solve particular problems of production or person40.

P. 155 (quoting HAYEK, supra note 37, at 35) (emphasis omitted).
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nel on an ad hoc basis; they change from day to day or week to week, depending on various conditions, and they are not guided in that changeability
by any general promulgated principles; some of these plans are communicated to all those who are affected by them; some are kept secret; some are
passed on to managers and allowed to trickle down to the assembly line;
some orders are issued not on the assumption that they are practicable but in
order to test the limits of what is practicable; and so on. The same is true for
military planning, both at the staff level and down the chain of command. So
large-scale planning is sometimes non-Fullerian; sometimes it does not look
like the rule of what we would call law.
The same is true also for the management of whole societies. Fuller
conceded that even large parts of the management of our own modem economy have to be like that: legalistic forms and particularly legal procedures
may be quite inappropriate in the area of economic allocation in a mixed
economy. 4' And some totalitarian societies, where planning reaches its epitome, have not proceeded on the basis of anything like a coherent set of
general principles communicated publicly in advance; they have governed
often through a combination of terror and the manipulation of ignorance in
order to achieve desired results. This is a way of ruling and it is a way of
planning. But many jurists, following Fuller, would say that this is not legal
planning and this mode of governance is not the rule of law.
So there are different ways of planning. Not everything that fails the test
of Fuller's principles ceases to be a plan or ceases to be an effective plan. If
nevertheless we insist on the importance of legality, we do so not on account
of its effectiveness but because we value the sort of ruling or planning that it
makes possible. As we saw earlier, Fuller says that we value this sort of ruling in part because of the way it respects human dignity; others, like Hayek,
say we value it for its constitution of an environment conducive to freedom.42 The point is that we use the word "law"-and not just the word but
the whole apparatus of legality and the heritage of our thinking about the
distinctiveness of law's forms, law's procedures, and law's commitmentsto mark this discrimination among forms of ruling and the values on which
this discrimination is based. It is a complex apparatus and heritage,
and-despite the depth and power of Shapiro's insights-I fear it cannot be
reductively accounted for by simply unpacking the concept of a plan.
VI. INTERPRETATION AND HISTORY

There are lots of riches in Scott Shapiro's book that I have been unable
to discuss in this Review. I have concentrated on the analogy between laws
and plans (or the assimilation of laws to plans) and on the lessons that Shapiro attempts to draw from that analogy (or assimilation). In doing that, I
have not been able to convey how well this book is written or how much
light the author is able to shed along the way on various issues in the
41.

See

42.

See F.A.

FULLER,

supra note 31, at 170-77.

HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY

133-61 (1960).
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philosophy of law. However, it would be wrong to end without noticing one
interesting position defended by Shapiro that, in my view, stands a little
apart from the main line of argument in Legality. It concerns Ronald Dworkin and the role of judges.
Dworkin holds the view that judges have to engage in Herculean exercises of moral judgment and moral theorizing in order to make sense of the
law. 43 Faced with a hard case involving the application of a difficult piece of
constitutional text or doctrine, Dworkin's judge tries to construe the whole
body of existing law in the best light he can, and he draws his decision for
the case in front of him from that construction. If the constitutional text uses
moral terminology like "cruel" or "unreasonable," Dworkin's judge reads
that as an instruction to develop his own best account of cruelty and unreasonableness and to decide the cases in front of him in the light of that." If it
requires "equal protection" or "due process of law," he takes those provisions and all the cases in which they have been applied and tries to make
moral sense out of that whole shebang in order to decide some case about
abortion or affirmative action, for example, that has turned up on his docket.
And in all of this, the Dworkinian judge works more or less as a moral philosopher, not in the sense of indulging his own subjective values, but trying
to figure out the objectively best account that can be given of all the concepts, values, and ideas that the law instructs him to consider. It means that
Dworkinian adjudication is a tremendously ambitious undertaking and one
that can never be separated from deep reflection on social values and first
principles.
Shapiro is pretty firmly opposed to all of this. Partly it is for reasons we
explored in Part V. He thinks that Dworkin's judge is being instructed to
open up and unsettle the very moral issues that it was the point of having a
constitution (a constitutional plan) to settle (p. 311). Shapiro'doesn't quite
explain what a judge is supposed to do when the allegedly settled plan uses
terms like "unreasonable" (in the Fourth Amendment) or "cruel" and "excessive" (in the Eighth Amendment), or entirely abstract ideas like "equal
protection" and "due process" (in the Fourteenth Amendment). He excuses
himself from that task, telling us simply that the Planning Theory explains
why these are difficult questions (p. 385) and implying that whatever the
right strategy of interpretation is (originalist, textualist, purposivist), it certainly can't be Dworkinian.
The main reason it can't be Dworkinian, he says, is that neither the framers of the Constitution nor the American people trust judges to engage in
the sort of enterprise that Dworkin recommends. What he calls "[t]he birth
story of the American republic" (p. 313) discloses a tremendous amount of
distrust and suspicion of the very attributes of moral judgment and moral
theorizing that officials-particularly judges-would have to engage in if
they were to follow Dworkin's advice. Shapiro's arguments here involve a
curious shift from the highly abstract general jurisprudence that pervades
43.

See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-75 (1986).

44.

See RONALD

DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES

120-21 (2006).
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the rest of the book to something quite peculiarly American. Though he acknowledges he is "[o]bviously" no historian (p. 313), he presents twelve
pages of history (pp. 313-24), populated with Federalists, Tories, and, above
all, radical Whigs, to show that "[t]he degree of analysis and discretion that
Dworkin's account demands would have undoubtedly struck these Whigs as
unreasonable" (p. 325). The Whigs didn't think that people possessed "the
competence necessary to engage in a philosophical investigation into the
moral vindication" of the legal regime (p. 325). "IT]hey did not regard the
political community as trustworthy and unified enough to rationalize so difficult, creative, and value-laden a procedure" (p. 327). And Shapiro does not
think that modem Americans are any less distrustful:
Because so many of the core rules of American constitutional law rest on
principles of abiding distrust toward individuals with power, the importance of checking discretion, and the fact of pluralism, any conception of
law that requires for its implementation a great deal of philosophical competence, moral rectitude, and political homogeneity will clash
irredeemably with such a legal structure. (p.329)
It is an odd and frustrating passage, but it is difficult to resist the impression that Shapiro is on to something. When judges or jurists reflect upon
interpretive strategy-i.e., on the strategy that is most appropriate for them
to adopt when they are considering the application of a difficult piece of text
or doctrine-they should consider not just how to reach the best result (by
their lights), but on their own place in what Shapiro calls the system's
"economy of trust" (p. 331). To the extent that they discern their own position as a distrusted position, they should veer away from strategies that give
great weight to the distinctiveness of their own thinking or their own apprehensions of social value, and perhaps they should move towards strategies
that give greater weight to values or modes of thinking that are already well
established in society. So, for example, instead of asking which punishments
are cruel by my own lights, as a judge I should ask which punishments are
cruel by socially-established standards of cruelty. The second question may
still be difficult to answer, and answering it will still be an enterprise in
which I have to make my own best efforts; but it might be more plausible to
say that I have been entrusted to ask and answer this question than to say
that I have been entrusted to ask and answer questions of moral philosophy.
Shapiro thinks that the idea of planning casts light on all this, and I think
he is right. (Indeed, I think his argument is on firmer-as well as jurisprudentially more interesting-ground when he connects distrust to the idea of
a plan than when he connects it to the views of radical Whigs in the 1780s.)
Plans, says Shapiro, are "sophisticated devices for managing trust and distrust" (p. 334). We adopt plans in the circumstances of legality often
because we have misgivings about trusting some people or sometimes trusting any people to sort out social and moral problems in an uncoordinated
way. This is true about the explicit assignment of roles in (say) a statutory
scheme:
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Legislators are supposed to identify those who are trustworthy and assign
them tasks that take advantage of their trustworthiness; conversely, they
are to identify those who are less reliable, plan out their behavior in greater
detail, and deny them the ability to abuse or exploit their power. ... The
task of institutional design, therefore, is to capitalize on trust while simultaneously compensating for distrust .. .. (p. 338)

And it must equally be true about our adoption of interpretive methodologies. We must approach interpretation self-consciously in a way that keeps
faith with the fact that it is a plan we are expounding, not a moral enterprise
of our own.
At the end of the book, Shapiro sums all this up by eulogizing the virtues of interpretation "inside the box" (p. 398), where the "the box" refers to
the overall plan that the interpreter is dealing with:
The Rule of Law flourishes ... only when legal interpreters possess a great
deal of self-discipline. They must . . . resist the impulse to take legal inter-

pretation as an invitation to philosophize about the great moral and
political questions of their time... . To be able to think inside the box ...
is the ultimate passive virtue of the legal interpreter. (p. 398)
I tried to show at the end of Part IV that it doesn't follow that "they must
suspend their moral judgment" (p. 398), for the plan may sometimes be that
a moral judgment is to be made by someone attempting to apply the law at
just this point. Shapiro is always in danger of exaggerating how much one
can draw from the proposition that the logic of planning is respected only
when the process of interpretation does not unsettle those questions that the
law aims to settle. But his discussion of all this is tremendously suggestive,
and like the rest of the book it shows that the idea of planning can indeed
cast light on the problems of jurisprudence without necessarily blinding us
to other analogies and other sources of insight.

